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Abstract
Existing risk capital allocation methods, such as the Euler rule, work under
the explicit assumption that portfolios are formed as linear combinations of ran-
dom loss/profit variables, with the firm being able to choose the portfolio weights.
This assumption is unrealistic in an insurance context, where arbitrary scaling of
risks is generally not possible. Here, we model risks as being partially generated by
Le´vy processes, capturing the non-linear aggregation of risk. The model leads to
non-homogeneous fuzzy games, for which the Euler rule is not applicable. For such
games, we seek capital allocations that are in the core, that is, do not provide incen-
tives for splitting portfolios. We show that the Euler rule of an auxiliary linearised
fuzzy game (non-uniquely) satisfies the core property and, thus, provides a plau-
sible and easily implemented capital allocation. In contrast, the Aumann-Shapley
allocation does not generally belong to the core. For the non-homogeneous fuzzy
games studied, Tasche’s (1999) criterion of suitability for performance measurement
is adapted and it is shown that the proposed allocation method gives appropriate
signals for improving the portfolio underwriting profit.
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1 Introduction
Financial firms often carry out a process of capital allocation, whereby the firm’s total
capital requirement is apportioned to different lines of business and sub-portfolios. The
total capital is typically calculated using a risk measure, such as standard deviation,
Tail-Value-at-Risk (TVaR) or Value-at-Risk (VaR), and reflects the diversification from
risk pooling in the portfolio. Alternative allocation methods reflect the different ways in
which individual risks and sub-portfolios contribute to the total capital. There are several
streams in the literature, respectively motivated by arguments from: (a) cooperative
game theory (Denault, 2001; Tsanakas and Barnett, 2003; Kalkbrener, 2005; Cso´ka
et al., 2009; Hougaard and Smilgins, 2016); (b) performance and portfolio management
(Tasche, 1999; Buch et al., 2011); (c) market valuation of assets and liabilities (Myers and
Read, 2001; Sherris, 2006; Zanjani, 2010; Bauer and Zanjani, 2015); and (d) optimization
(Dhaene et al., 2003; Dhaene et al., 2012).
A standard assumption in the literature is that portfolios are formed as linear combi-
nations of random loss/profit variables, with the decision maker being able to choose the
portfolio weights. As already noted by Mildenhall (2004, 2006), this assumption is not
necessarily appropriate in an insurance context. Losses from an insurance portfolio arise
from the aggregation of claims that are generally not perfectly dependent. Increasing
the exposure in a line of business within an insurance portfolio does not correspond to
linearly scaling up the loss, but to adding more policies to the portfolio (a similar lack
of linear scalability is observed in credit risk portfolios). When insurance policies are
independent, then claims can be modelled via Le´vy processes; for instance the compound
Poisson process is the canonical example in the actuarial literature. The risk capital is
then determined by a risk measure evaluated at the aggregate claim. While the risk mea-
sure typically used is positively homogeneous (e.g. the standard deviation or a distortion
risk measure such as TVaR), the risk capital is not homogeneous in the exposures; due
to diversification effects, doubling the number of insurance policies written does not lead
to a doubling of the required risk capital.
In this paper we address capital allocation using a model that incorporates both Le´vy
and linear portfolio components. Our main focus is on game theoretical arguments.
A function r, mapping exposures to capital requirements, is called a fuzzy game. A
fundamental question in this framework is whether candidate capital allocations belong
to the core of r. An allocation that belongs to the core of r ensures that a lower amount of
capital is allocated to any sub-portfolio, compared to it being operated on a stand-alone
basis. When portfolios are linearly scalable, then the gradient of the fuzzy game, known
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as the Euler rule (Tasche, 1999), provides the unique core allocation (Aubin, 1979; 1981;
Denault, 2001). However, in our case, as the fuzzy game r is not homogeneous, the Euler
rule is no longer applicable.
We introduce an auxiliary homogeneous fuzzy game r˜, which can be seen as a lin-
earisation of the original fuzzy game r. The values of r and r˜ coincide in the cases of
full/no participation in individual lines of business. Furthermore, it is shown that, for
risk measures such as TVaR or standard deviation, which preserve convex order, r˜ is
dominated by r. As a consequence the Euler rule for the auxiliary fuzzy game r˜ belongs
to the core of r. However, we note that for risk measures like VaR, which do not preserve
convex order, the core may be empty.
Thus, our method gives a general construction of core capital allocations, applicable
to insurance portfolios. Our finding is particularly relevant for the practice of insurance
risk management. The Euler rule is often applied in the insurance industry, with the
implicit but incorrect assumption of portfolio linearity. Our results show that using such
a ‘wrong’ model with homogeneous risks turns out to give a risk allocation that is a core
element of the ‘correct’ underlying fuzzy game.
Our proposed capital allocation method improves upon previous attempts to deal
with risk portfolios that are non-linear in the exposures. In particular, Powers (2007)
studies the Aumann-Shapley value (Aumann and Shapley, 1974), which is applicable in
the case of non-homogeneous fuzzy games. However, the Aumann-Shapley value typi-
cally fails to produce computationally tractable risk capital allocations. Furthermore,
we show the Aumann-Shapley value does not need to be in the core of r, except in the
special case where the fuzzy game r is concave. Therefore, Aumann-Shapley allocations
can produce incentives for portfolio fragmentation.
Finally, we consider implications for portfolio management. For linear portfolios, it
is possible to derive appropriate signals for portfolio management, by evaluating for each
line of business the return on allocated capital, as calculated by the Euler rule (Tasche,
1999). However, the diversification implicit in aggregating insurance risks necessitates
the consideration of capital constraints. We adapt the arguments of Tasche (1999)
and show that the proposed capital allocation method provides appropriate signals for
increasing the aggregate underwriting profit.
Section 2 introduces the model and risk measures used. Section 3 contains the main
contributions of this paper, including the proposed capital allocation method and the
study of the core of the fuzzy game r. Signals for portfolio management are discussed
in Section 4 and brief conclusions given in Section 5.
3
2 Model outline
We consider a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,P, {Fw}0≤w≤W ) with F = FW for given
W > 1. Throughout, (in-)equalities between random variables are understood in the
P-a.s. sense.
A financial firm, such as an insurance company, writes I lines of business. The
exposure of the financial firm to the ith line of business is described by 0 ≤ wi ≤W , and
the loss arising from that line of business is denoted by the random variable Xi(wi) ∈
L1(Ω,F ,P), i = 1, . . . , I. The total loss of the financial firm as a function of the exposure
w = (w1, . . . , wI)
′ is denoted by
S(w) =
I∑
i=1
Xi(wi). (1)
The current (base-line) exposure of the firm is w = 1I = (1, . . . , 1)
′, leading to the total
loss S(1I) =
∑I
i=1Xi(1) .
To provide a tractable structure for the ways in which changes in exposure w af-
fect the joint law of the losses, we introduce the following model. Consider the random
vector Y(w) = (Y1(w1), . . . , YI(wI))
′, where Yi = (Yi(w))0≤w≤W are Fw-adapted in-
dependent increasing Le´vy processes for i = 1, . . . , I. Let Z = (Z1, . . . , ZI)
′ be an
FW -measurable random vector (having possibly dependent components), and assume
that Z and (Yi)i=1,...,I are independent. Then, we define for i = 1, . . . , I and exposure
wi ∈ [0,W ] the loss arising from the ith line of business by
Xi(wi) = Yi(wi) + wiZi. (2)
We also write Xi = (Xi(w))0≤w≤W and X(w) = Y(w) + w · Z, where w · Z is the
Hadamard (element-wise) product.1
We stress that the ‘development’ of the stochastic processes Yi does not represent
elapsed time, but increase in exposure. Thus, stopping the process at point wi cor-
responds to placing a limit on the exposure of the ith line of business. Losses from
insurance portfolios can be modelled as aggregations of (typically independent) claim
amounts from different policies, for which Le´vy processes (with their connection to in-
finitely divisible distributions) provide an appropriate representation. Henceforth, the
1X is defined on the domain [0,W ]I with W > 1, which extends the exposures beyond the base-line
exposure 1I . In part this is due to mathematical convenience, since in Section 3 derivatives of functions
(fuzzy games) at w = 1I will be taken. But also, in Section 4, the strategic behavior of the firm is
considered, which includes the potential for portfolio expansion beyond base-line exposure w = 1I .
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dynamics of the processes Yi are not of particular interest in this paper; all distributions
and moments evaluated are with respect to information F0.
The model allows two special cases:
• If Yi(wi) ≡ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , I, then Xi(wi) = wiXi(1), and the loss of the ith line
of business scales linearly in wi. This is the common situation described e.g. by
Tasche (1999), where Xi(1) can be seen as the (negative) values of tradable assets
and wi are portfolio weights.
• If Zi = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , I, then the line of business losses Xi are Le´vy processes.
In that case, Xi can represent a standard actuarial risk model. For example, if Xi
is a Poisson process with unit intensity, then Xi(wi) ∼ Poisson(wi). Now, Xi(wi)
is no longer linearly scalable with exposure, in particular, we have for its variance
the property V(Xi(wi)) = wiV(Xi(1)).
The full model (2) can then be viewed as an insurance risk component Yi(wi) aug-
mented by common shocks wiZi that simultaneously affect all claims from the i
th line
of business2. Dependence between losses of different lines of business is induced by the
possible dependence between the elements of Z; it is straightforward that for i 6= j we
have covariance C(Xi(wi), Xj(wj)) = wiwjC(Zi, Zj).
In general, the processes Xi do not have independent increments; however the incre-
ments remain identically distributed.
Lemma 2.1. Let 0 ≤ vi < wi ≤W for all i = 1, . . . , I. Then, X(w)−X(v) d= X(w−v).
Proof. The claim follows from the following identity
X(w)−X(v) = Y(w) +w · Z− (Y(v) + v · Z)
d
= Y(w − v) + (w − v) · Z
= X(w − v),
where we have used standard properties of Le´vy processes and the independence between
Y and Z.
Example 2.2. Let I = 2 and consider the model Xi(wi) = Yi(wi) + wiσiZi, i = 1, 2,
where Yi are Poisson processes with intensities λi, σ1, σ2 > 0, and Z = (Z1, Z2) is a
2An alternative interpretation of model (2) arises by considering wiZi as losses from a linear portfolio
with weights w. Then, the Le´vy component Yi can be seen as representing operational costs associated
with the ith line of business. In this interpretation, expected operational costs are increasing linearly
with exposure, but become less volatile as the portfolio grows.
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bivariate normally distributed random vector with standard margins and correlation
C(Z1, Z2) = η ∈ [−1, 1].
While the expected values of Xi(wi) scale with exposures, E(Xi(wi))) = wiλi, this is
not the case when we consider the volatility (measured by the standard deviation) since
we have
√
V(Xi(wi)) =
√
wiλi + w2i σ
2
i . The covariance of the total losses from the two
lines of business is given by C(X1(w1), X2(w2)) = w1w2σ1σ2η. 
To determine the capital requirements for its portfolio, the financial firm uses a risk
measure ρ : L1(Ω,F ,P) → R. Hence, the firm’s capital requirement for the base-line
exposure 1I is given by ρ(S(1I)). We assume throughout the paper that ρ(S(1I)) is
finite.
Let V1, V2 be two elements of L
1(Ω,F ,P). Throughout the paper, we assume that
the risk measure ρ satisfies the following properties:
• Law invariance: V1 d= V2 =⇒ ρ(V1) = ρ(V2).
• Positive homogeneity: ρ(aV1) = aρ(V1) for a ≥ 0.
• Subadditivity: ρ(V1 + V2) ≤ ρ(V1) + ρ(V2).
• Consistency with convex order: V1 cx V2 =⇒ ρ(V1) ≤ ρ(V2).
Recall the definition of convex order: V1 cx V2 if E(u(V1)) ≤ E(u(V2)) for all convex
functions u such that the expectations exist (see, e.g., Denuit et al., 2006).
The standard deviation ρ(V ) =
√
V(V ) gives a simple example of a risk measure
satisfying the above properties; note that to satisfy ρ(V ) < ∞ one needs to restrict
the space of loss positions considered to those with finite second moments, i.e. V ∈
L2(Ω,F ,P). While the standard deviation is not easily interpreted as giving a reasonable
capital requirement, typically, the standard deviation principle ρ(V ) = E(V )+β
√
V(V ),
β > 0, admits such an interpretation and still satisfies the required properties.
A further popular family of risk measures satisfying the stated properties is that of
coherent distortion risk measures (Wang et al., 1997; Acerbi, 2002), defined by
ρ(V ) =
∫ 1
0
F−1V (u)ζ(u)du = E
(
V ζ(UV )
)
, (3)
where
F−1V (u) = inf{x ∈ R : P(V ≤ x) ≥ u} (4)
is the quantile function of V (generalised inverse of the distribution function FV (·) =
P(V ≤ ·)); ζ is an increasing non-negative weight function on [0, 1] with normalization
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∫ 1
0 ζ(u)du = 1; and UV is a uniform random variable on [0, 1] increasing in (comonotonic
to) V .3
An example of a coherent distortion risk measure is Tail-Value-at-Risk (TVaR)
TVaRp(V ) =
1
1− p
∫ 1
p
F−1V (u)du, (5)
derived by setting ζ(u) = 11−p1{u>p}. When the distribution function of V is continuous,
then we have that TVaRp(V ) = E
(
V |V > F−1V (p)
)
(e.g. Dhaene et al., 2006).
The Value-at-Risk (VaR) risk measure, given by the quantile function,
VaRp(V ) = F
−1
V (p), (6)
is not subadditive or consistent with the convex order (Denuit et al., 2005, Section 2.3.2)
and thus not considered further in this paper apart from Example 3.16.
Example 2.3. Following up Example 2.2, let the risk measure be the standard deviation
ρ(S(w)) =
√
V(S(w)). Then, the risk measure of the aggregate loss of portfolio w is
given by
ρ(S(w)) =
√
w1λ1 + w2λ2 + w21σ
2
1 + w
2
2σ
2
2 + 2w1w2σ1σ2η.
To evaluate distortion risk measures it is necessary to use the whole distribution
function of S(w). Let pk(w) =
(w1λ1+w2λ2)k exp(−w1λ1−w2λ2)
k! be the probability mass in
k ∈ N0 of a Poisson(w1λ1 + w2λ2)-distributed random variable. Then, the distribution
of S(w) is given by
FS(w)(s) =
∞∑
k=0
pk(w)Φ
(
s− k√
w21σ
2
1 + w
2
2σ
2
2 + 2w1w2σ1σ2η
)
,
where Φ(·) is the standard normal distribution. For example, when ρ(·) = TVaRp(·),
numerical inversion of FS(w) yields F
−1
S(w)(p), and subsequently the calculation of the
risk measure follows by
ρ(S(w)) =
1
1− p
∞∑
k=0
pk(w)E
(
Ak1{Ak>F−1S(w)(p)}
)
,
3Such a variable always exists. If the distribution FV (x) = P(V ≤ x) is strictly increasing then
UV = FV (V ); otherwise Ru¨schendorf’s (2009) generalised distributional transform can be used.
7
where Ak ∼ N(k,w21σ21 + w22σ22 + 2w1w2σ1σ2η), with partial moments
E
(
Ak1{Ak>F−1S(w)(p)}
)
= (1− Φ(ak))
(
k +
√
w21σ
2
1 + w
2
2σ
2
2 + 2w1w2σ1σ2η
ϕ(ak)
1− Φ (ak)
)
,
for ak =
F−1
S(w)
(p)−k√
w21σ
2
1+w
2
2σ
2
2+2w1w2σ1σ2η
and ϕ(·) being the standard normal density. 
3 Capital allocations
3.1 Fuzzy games and their cores
We begin this section by introducing fuzzy games. A fuzzy game is a (typically non-
linear) function, defined on vectors whose elements represent participation rates in dif-
ferent activities. The value of the fuzzy game stands for the resulting cost. In the setting
of this paper, ‘participation’ corresponds to exposure in different lines of business and
‘cost’ stands for the capital requirement. Further interpretation of the properties of
fuzzy games and allocations in the context of insurance risk management is provided in
Section 3.2 below.
Following Aubin (1979, 1981), we call any function g : [0,W ]I → R, W > 1, a fuzzy
game. The following properties of fuzzy games will be referred to in the sequel:
• Positive homogeneity: g(aw) = ag(w) for all w ∈ [0,W ]I and a ∈ [0, 1].
• Subadditivity: for any w,w1,w2 ∈ [0,W ]I such that w1 + w2 = w, we have
g(w) ≤ g(w1) + g(w2).
Allocations of fuzzy games represent apportionments of costs to different business
activities.
Definition 3.1. A vector d ∈ RI is called an allocation of the fuzzy game g if ∑Ii=1 di =
g(1I).
The core of a fuzzy game is defined as follows (Aubin, 1979; 1981).
Definition 3.2. The core of the fuzzy game g : [0,W ]I 7→ R, denoted by C(g), is the set
of allocations d ∈ RI of g such that ∑Ii=1widi ≤ g(w) for all w ∈ [0, 1]I .
Core allocations thus produce apportionments of costs such that a subset of activities
with incomplete participation is always assigned a lower cost than it would be the case if
those activities were pursued on a stand-alone basis. A commonly encountered allocation
is the Euler allocation (Aubin, 1979, 1981; Tasche, 1999).
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Definition 3.3. Let the fuzzy game g be positively homogeneous and partially differen-
tiable at 1I . Then, the Euler allocation is defined as the gradient of g at 1I :
dE(g) ∈ RI , with components dEi (g) =
∂g(w)
∂wi
∣∣∣∣
w=1I
, for i = 1, . . . , I.
By positive homogeneity of g, it follows from Euler’s homogeneous function theorem
that
∑I
i=1 d
E
i (g) = g(1I); thus d
E(g) is an allocation in the sense of Definition 3.1. If g
is in addition subadditive, then the Euler allocation is the unique element of the core.
Lemma 3.4 (Aubin, 1979). Let g : [0,W ]I 7→ R be positively homogeneous and subad-
ditive. It holds that C(g) 6= ∅. If g is partially differentiable at w = 1I , then C(g) is
single-valued and dE(g) is its unique element.
Cases where g is not partially differentiable at w = 1I are studied by, e.g., Mertens
(1988) and Boonen et al. (2012). We do not discuss this situation in more detail here.
For general fuzzy games that are not necessarily positively homogeneous, the Aumann-
Shapley allocation (Aumann and Shapley, 1974) for the game g is defined as follows.
Definition 3.5. The Aumann-Shapley allocation of the fuzzy game g is defined by
dAS(g) ∈ RI , with components dASi (g) =
∫ 1
0
∂
∂wi
g(β1I)dβ, for i = 1, . . . , I, (7)
whenever the integral exists.
Note that for positively homogeneous fuzzy games, the Aumann-Shapley allocation
reduces to the Euler allocation (Denault, 2001). A sufficient condition for (7) to exist,
and to guarantee that it is an allocation, is continuous differentiability of g (Aumann
and Shapley, 1974).4 We will discuss this allocation rule for non-homogeneous fuzzy
games in Section 3.4 below.
3.2 Construction of a core allocation for the insurance risk model
Consider the insurance risk model of Section 2. We define the fuzzy game r : [0,W ]I → R
as follows
r(w) = ρ
(
I∑
i=1
Xi(wi)
)
, for all w ∈ [0,W ]I . (8)
4This result is extended to a class of piece-wise continuously differentiable functions g by Samet et
al. (1984).
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The fuzzy game r represents the capital that the firm must hold as a function of its
exposure w. As before, the base-line exposure of the firm is the one of full participation
in each line of business, w = 1I , which provides r(1I) = ρ (S(1I)).
The fuzzy game r inherits the subadditivity property from the risk measure ρ.
Lemma 3.6. The fuzzy game r defined in (8) is subadditive.
Proof. For all w,w1,w2 ∈ [0,W ]I such that w1 +w2 = w, we have:
r(w) = ρ
(
I∑
i=1
Xi(w
1
i ) +
I∑
i=1
(
Xi(wi)−Xi(w1i )
))
≤ ρ
(
I∑
i=1
Xi(w
1
i )
)
+ ρ
(
I∑
i=1
(
Xi(wi)−Xi(w1i )
))
= ρ
(
I∑
i=1
Xi(w
1
i )
)
+ ρ
(
I∑
i=1
(
Xi(wi − w1i )
))
= r(w1) + r(w2).
The inequality follows from the subadditivity of ρ, and the subsequent equality from
Lemma 2.1 and the law invariance of ρ.
The subadditivity of r implies that savings in capital occur when loss exposures are
aggregated, due to diversification. A capital allocation d provides a mechanism for as-
sessing the risk contribution of different sub-portfolios and lines of business, respectively.
The elements of d can be seen as internal capital contribution rates, such that the con-
tribution of a sub-portfolio (set of policies) w ∈ [0, 1]I to the total capital r(1I) can be
quantified as
∑I
i=1widi.
The focus of this section is on the stability of the portfolio. Given subadditivity of r,
a capital allocation d should not give an incentive to split the portfolio of full exposures.
This stipulation can be translated into the requirement that the allocation d should be in
the core of r. If d ∈ C(r), then the capital allocated to the sub-portfolio with exposures
w satisfies
∑I
i=1widi ≤ r(w), such that the risk contribution of any sub-portfolio is less
than its stand-alone capital.
The same argument is used by Denault (2001), who deals with the special case of
linear portfolios, i.e. Yi=0 for all i = 1, . . . , I, and proposes the use of Euler allocations.
However, in our context, the Euler allocation is not applicable, since r does generally not
satisfy positive homogeneity, unless Xi(wi) and wiXi have the same distribution (which
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happens when Yi=0, i = 1, . . . , I). Lack of homogeneity implies
∑I
i=1
∂r(w)
∂wi
∣∣∣
w=1I
6=
r(1I).
To construct an element of C(r), we introduce an auxiliary fuzzy game. Consider the
fuzzy game r˜ : RI 7→ R, defined by
r˜(w) := ρ
(
I∑
i=1
wiXi(1)
)
. (9)
The fuzzy game r˜ can be seen as a linearised version of r. The fuzzy game r˜ is both
positively homogeneous and subadditive; this follows directly from the corresponding
properties of the risk measure ρ. The two fuzzy games r and r˜ represent different ways
in which sub-portfolios may be formed: r(w) represents the capital requirement for the
exposure w as discussed in Section 2, while r˜(w) gives the capital for a portfolio that
would be composed of proportional shares of the full lines of business Xi(1) (which might
be interpreted as co-insurance or proportional re-insurance shares).
By positive homogeneity of r˜ we can derive the Euler allocation dE(r˜) (subject to
differentiability). By Lemma 3.4, if dE(r˜) is well-defined, then dE(r˜) ∈ C(r˜). We will
show in the sequel that it is also the case that dE(r˜) ∈ C(r).
Firstly, the relation between r and r˜ is further characterised. While in general r˜(w) 6=
r(w), it obviously holds that r˜(1I) = r(1I) and r˜(0I) = r(0I) = 0; furthermore r˜(w) =
r(w) for all w ∈ {0, 1}I . For sub-portfolios of partial exposure, w ∈ [0, 1]I \ {0, 1}I , we
have the following result.
Proposition 3.7. For all w ∈ [0, 1]I , we have r˜(w) ≤ r(w).
Proof. First we show that for each i = 1, . . . , I, wiYi(1) cx Yi(wi), where Yi are the
processes of model (2). For wi ∈ {0, 1} this follows trivially. Assume initially that
wi is rational, with wi =
p
q , for p, q ∈ N+, p < q. Since Yi is a Le´vy process, it is
Yi(1)
d
=
∑q
k=1 Uk, for some i.i.d. random variables U1, . . . , Uq. Furthermore, Yi(p/q)
d
=∑p
k=1 Uk =
∑q
k=1 ukUk, where uk = 1, for k = 1, . . . , p, and uk = 0, for k = p+ 1, . . . , q.
Denote u¯ = 1q
∑q
k=1 uk =
p
q . Then, from Denuit et al. (2006, Corollary 3.4.24), we get
that
u¯
q∑
k=1
Uk cx
q∑
k=1
ukUk =⇒ p
q
Yi(1) cx Yi
(
p
q
)
.
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For irrational wi, let pq = bwiqc, such that pqq ≤ wi. Then,
pq
q
Yi(1) cx Yi
(
pq
q
)
≤ Yi(wi) =⇒ pq
q
Yi(1) sl Yi(wi)
by increasingness of the process Yi, where ‘sl’ is the stop-loss order (Denuit et al.,
2006). We have, as q →∞,
pq
q Yi(1)
d→ wiYi(1)
E
((
pq
q Yi(1)
)
+
)
→ E ((wiYi(1))+) .
Hence, by Denuit et al. (2006, Proposition 3.4.25), it is wiYi(1) sl Yi(wi). Since
E(wiYi(1)) = E(Yi(wi)), we also have wiYi(1) cx Yi(wi).
By the independence of the processes Y1, . . . , YI , it follows from Denuit et al. (2006,
Proposition 3.4.25) that
∑I
i=1wiYi(1) cx
∑I
i=1 Yi(wi). Since Z is independent of Y ,
we get for any convex function u:
E
(
u
(
I∑
i=1
wiYi(1) + wiZi
))
= E
[
E
(
u
(
I∑
i=1
wiYi(1) + wiZi
)∣∣∣∣∣Z
)]
≤ E
[
E
(
u
(
I∑
i=1
Yi(wi) + wiZi
)∣∣∣∣∣Z
)]
= E
(
u
(
I∑
i=1
Yi(wi) + wiZi
))
.
Hence,
I∑
i=1
wiXi(1) =
I∑
i=1
wiYi(1) +
I∑
i=1
wiZi
cx
I∑
i=1
Yi(wi) +
I∑
i=1
wiZi =
I∑
i=1
Xi(wi).
The result follows from the consistency of ρ with the convex order.
An implication of Proposition 3.7 is that, if an element of the core of r˜ is identified,
then this will also belong to the core of r:
Proposition 3.8. It holds that C(r˜) ⊆ C(r).
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Proof. Let d ∈ C(r˜). Then, it holds for all w ∈ [0, 1]I that
I∑
i=1
widi ≤ r˜(w) ≤ r(w),
where the last inequality follows from Proposition 3.7. Furthermore,
∑I
i=1 di = r˜(1I) =
r(1I). Hence, d ∈ C(r).
Lemma 3.4 and Proposition 3.8 indicate that the core of r is non-empty. In particular,
as stated in the corollary below, dE(r˜) is an element of the core of r.
Corollary 3.9. If dE(r˜) exists, then dE(r˜) ∈ C(r).
Hence, the Euler allocation of r˜, which is well-studied in the literature, also provides
a reasonable allocation for the fuzzy game r, which is the main object of interest in this
paper. However, dE(r˜) is not necessarily the only element of C(r); as will be discussed
in Section 3.3, C(r) is not necessarily single-valued.
These results matter for practical applications. When capital allocation exercises are
performed by insurance firms, the allocation dE(r˜) is frequently used. However, r˜ does
not generally correspond to a realistic situation in insurance, as linear portfolio weights
cannot be arbitrarily changed; often one can only vary exposures in the way captured
by r. In fact, the quantity
∑I
i=1wiXi(1) is only meaningful in an insurance context
for w ∈ [0, 1]I , since multiples of insurance contracts cannot be traded, while shares of
contracts may be transferred via co-insurance and proportional re-insurance to a third
party. Thus, allocations used in practice are based on the ‘wrong game’ r˜, rather than
the ‘game actually played’ r. But our results show that this is not a serious problem,
since via the Euler allocation of r˜, we end up with an element of the core of r.
We show in Appendix A that the Euler allocation of r˜ in closed-form in case ρ is the
standard deviation or a distortion risk measure.
Remark 3.10. It is argued in the literature that the lack of homogeneity of e.g. credit
risk exposures (and thus of r) becomes negligible in large diversified portfolios (see
McNeil et al., 2005, Section 8.4.3; Buch et al., 2011; consider also Mildenhall, 2006,
Figure 5). In such portfolios, the impact of risk factors driving the dependence of the
portfolio dominates that of idiosyncratic Le´vy-type risk factors – indeed, then we have
that the fuzzy games r and r˜ are close. However, this is not the argument of the present
paper. The Euler rule, applied to r˜, provides an allocation in the core of r, regardless of
whether r˜ gives a good approximation to r. This means that the proposed allocation is
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also useful in the case of less diversified portfolios where the Le´vy component dominates,
e.g. low-frequency catastrophic risks.
Remark 3.11. Requiring that allocations belong to the core is motivated by preserving
the portfolio’s stability. It could be argued that it is unrealistic to expect that allocations
not in the core will actually produce portfolio fragmentation – it is after all not neces-
sarily possible for a manager to withdraw her sub-portfolio and survive in the market.
Nonetheless, allocations not in the core do present a viable business situation. Present-
ing a portfolio manager with an amount of allocated capital that is larger than what
the stand-alone capital would be (or indeed creating a sub-portfolio with this property)
would mean assigning a diversification penalty rather than a benefit. This would be
organizationally untenable, leading to the capital allocation method not being applied
at all.
3.3 Geometric structure of the core
The fuzzy game r defines a hyper-surface in [0, 1]I × R:
R : [0, 1]I → [0, 1]I × R; w 7→ (w, r(w)) .
Similarly, r˜ defines a hyper-surface R˜ in [0, 1]I ×R. It follows from Proposition 3.7 that
the hyper-surface R lies above the hyper-surface R˜, with points of intersection including
at least the set of corners {(w, r(w)) : w ∈ {0, 1}I}.
Let d ∈ RI be an allocation of r. Then d defines the hyper-plane
H(d) : [0, 1]I → [0, 1]I × R; w 7→ (w,w′d) .
The requirement d ∈ C(r) is equivalent to asking that the hyper-plane H(d) is located
below the hyper-surface R. There are at least two intersections between the two hyper-
surfaces given by the corner points (0I , r(0I)) = (0I , 0) and (1I , r(1I)). In particular,
in view of Corollary 3.9, the Euler allocation dE(r˜) ∈ C(r˜) ⊆ C(r) is dominated by both
hyper-surfaces R and R˜, respectively.
The following example demonstrates these geometric ideas, and shows how they allow
us to analyze graphically whether the core C(r) is single-valued.
Example 3.12. Let I = 2 and Zi = 0 for i = 1, 2, so that we have a pure insurance
risk model with two lines of business. Assume that Y1 and Y2 are Poisson processes with
intensities λ1 and λ2, such that S(w) ∼ Poisson(w1λ1 + w2λ2).
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Figure 1: Two aspects from different angles of the hyper-surfaces R (red), R˜ (green)
and H(dE(r˜)) (blue); Example 3.12.
Let the risk measure be given by the standard deviation. Then,
r(w) =
√
V(S(w)) =
√
w1λ1 + w2λ2.
The auxiliary fuzzy game r˜ is given by
r˜(w) =
√
V(w1Y1(1) + w2Y2(1)) =
√
w21λ1 + w
2
2λ2.
It is apparent that r˜(w) ≤ r(w), since w2i ≤ wi for w ∈ [0, 1]2. The Euler allocation is
derived as
dEi (r˜) =
∂r˜(w)
∂wi
∣∣∣∣
w=1I
=
λi√
λ1 + λ2
, i = 1, 2.
The three surfaces R (red), R˜ (green) and H(dE(r˜)) (blue) are shown in Figure 1 for
λ1 = λ2 = 1. It is seen that R dominates R˜, which in turn dominates H(dE(r˜)). The
intersection of R and R˜ at the corner points is also visible. Notably, while r is concave,
r˜ is convex. 
The visualisation of Example 3.12 demonstrates that the core of r may contain more
elements than dE(r˜), in contrast to the core of r˜, which is single-valued, see Lemma 3.4.
Alternative allocations d can be derived by rotating the hyper-plane H(dE(r˜)) around
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axis `, which is the diagonal in the cuboid [0, 1]I × [0, r(1I)] and is given by
` =
{
λ(1, . . . , 1, r(1I)) ∈ [0, 1]I × [0, r(1I)]; λ ∈ [0, 1]
} ⊂ H(dE(r˜)).
These rotations are described by the normalised vectors d ∈ RI , ∑Ii=1 di = r(1) and
provide the hyper-planes H(d), containing `. If the resulting rotated hyper-plane H(d)
is still dominated by R, then d ∈ C(r).
Following on from the previous example, it is shown that rotations of H(dE(r˜)) can
indeed produce core elements of r.
Example 3.13. Continuing from Example 3.12, consider allocations of the following
form
d1(α) =
λ1 − α√
λ1 + λ2
and d2(α) =
λ2 + α√
λ1 + λ2
,
for some α ≥ 0. The resulting planes H(d(α)) are indeed rotations of H(dE(r˜)); note
that H(d(α)) and H(dE(r˜)) must intersect by construction at the points (0, 0, 0) and
(1, 1,
√
λ1 + λ2).
The situation is demonstrated in Figure 2, which shows the surfaces R (red) and
H(d(α)) (blue). On the left-hand side the plane is plotted for an allocation with rotation
α = 0.4. While the rotation is visible, compared to Figure 1, the hyper-plane H(d(0.4))
is still below the hyper-surface R, and d(0.4) is in the core of r. On the right-hand
side an allocation with rotation α = 0.6 is shown. Here, it is seen that the rotation
is excessive, in the sense that H(d(0.6)) is made to intersect at non-corner points (and
thereby locally dominates) R. For sub-portfolios w such that the blue hyper-plane is
above the red hyper-surface, incentives are thus created to leave the portfolio, i.e. d(0.6)
is not in the core of r.
Furthermore, one can see from Figure 2 that concavity of r implies that, in order to
have d(α) ∈ C(r), one needs to check only whether the (rotated) hyper-plane H(d(α))
lies below the hyper-surface R at the corner points w = (1, 0) and w = (0, 1). Hence we
require
d1(α) ≤ r(1, 0) =⇒ λ1 − α√
λ1 + λ2
≤
√
λ1,
d2(α) ≤ r(0, 1) =⇒ λ2 + α√
λ1 + λ2
≤
√
λ2,
which for λ1 = λ2 = 1 implies |α| ≤
√
2 − 1 ' 0.41. All rotations α satisfying this
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Figure 2: Hyper-surfaces R (red) and H(d(α)) (blue), for rotations α = 0.4 (left-hand
side) and α = 0.6 (right-hand side); Example 3.13.
requirement provide allocations d(α) ∈ C(r). Figure 2 shows that a rotation with α = 0.4
yields an allocation close to the boundary of the core C(r). 
Example 3.13 demonstrates geometrically that concavity of r ensures that C(r) will
contain more elements than the Euler allocation dE(r˜), since there exist rotations of
H(dE(r˜)) remaining below R. Furthermore, to characterise core allocations, it suffices
to focus on the corner points w ∈ {0, 1}I . The following results formalise this insight.
Here and in the sequel denote I = {1, . . . , I}. For any S ⊆ I, denote by eS ∈ RI the
vector with elements eS,i = 1 if i ∈ S and eS,i = 0 otherwise.
Proposition 3.14. Let r be concave. Then, C(r) = CC(r), where the crisp core CC(r)
is the set of allocations d of r such that
∑I
i=1widi ≤ r(w) for all w ∈ {0, 1}I .
Proof. The inclusion C(r) ⊆ CC(r) is trivial, so we only show CC(r) ⊆ C(r). Let a ∈
CC(r), i.e., it holds that ∑i∈S ai ≤ r(eS) for all S ⊆ I. It is shown by Owen (1972,
below Equation (8) therein) that∑
S⊆I\{i}
∏
j∈S
wj
∏
j∈I\(S∪{i})
(1− wj) = 1, (10)
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for any i ∈ I and w ∈ [0, 1]I\{i}. Then, we get for any w ∈ [0, 1]I that
I∑
i=1
wiai =
∑
S⊆I
∏
i∈S
wi
∏
j∈I\S
(1− wj)
∑
i∈S
ai
≤
∑
S⊆I
∏
i∈S
wi
∏
j∈I\S
(1− wj)
 r(eS)
≤ r
∑
S⊆I
∏
i∈S
wi
∏
j∈I\S
(1− wj)
 eS

= r
 I∑
i=1
wiei
∑
S⊆I\{i}
∏
j∈S
wj
∏
j∈I\(S∪{i})
(1− wj)


= r(w),
where the first equality is due to Owen (1972, Theorem 2), the second inequality is due
to the concavity of r, and the last equality is due to (10).
The crisp core was originally defined for cooperative transferable utility games by
Gillies (1953). If the fuzzy game r is concave, it is known (Shapley, 1971) that the crisp
core can be characterised by its marginal vectors. Let Π(I) be the set of all permutations
of the set I = {1, . . . , I}. For some σ ∈ Π(I), we write σ = {σ(1), . . . , σ(I)}. The core
is precisely characterised by the following proposition; in fact, it is a convex polytope.
Proposition 3.15. (Shapley, 1971, Theorems 3 and 5) Let r be concave. Then, we have
CC(r) = conv{mσ ∈ RI : σ ∈ Π(I)},
where
mσσ(1) = r(e{σ(1)})
mσσ(i) = r(e{σ(1),...,σ(i)})− r(e{σ(1),...,σ(i−1)}), i = 2, . . . , I,
and conv is the convex hull of its arguments.
For I = 2, we get from Proposition 3.15 that the core is given by the set C(r) =
conv{(r(1, 0), r(1, 1)− r(1, 0)), (r(1, 1)− r(0, 1), r(0, 1))}.
While concavity of r allows a complete characterization of C(r), most risk measures
will actually not yield a concave r for the insurance risk model (2); even when the
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standard deviation risk measure is used, concavity is only guaranteed by Zi = 0 for all
i = 1, . . . , I. However, C(r) will generally still not be single-valued, as the next example
demonstrates.
Example 3.16. Consider the same independent Poisson model as in Examples 3.12 and
3.13, but with the two different risk measures TVaR (see (5)) and VaR (see (6)), each
evaluated with p = 0.9. For λ1 = λ2 = 1, we plot in Figure 3 the hyper-surfaces R
and H(d) for d with d1 = d2 = r(1,1)2 . Observe that by symmetry in the model we have
d = dE(r˜). The plot on the left-hand side in Figure 3 corresponds to the TVaR risk
measure. It is seen directly that r is not concave. But since TVaR preserves convex
order, as Corollary 3.9 implies, the hyper-plane H(d) lies below the hyper-surface R,
such that d is in the core of r. Furthermore, it is clear that rotations such that H(d)
remains below R are possible.
In contrast, the plot on the right-hand side of Figure 3, corresponding to the VaR
risk measure (see (6)), which does not preserve convex order, shows that d is not in the
core of r, since there are areas where the hyper-plane H(d) lies above the hyper-surface
R. Actually, the core is empty for any specification of λ1, λ2 and p. The random variable
S(w) has a positive probability mass at zero: P(S(w) = 0) = exp(−w1λ1 − w2λ2) > 0.
Therefore, we can always choose w1 and w2 sufficiently small such that P(S(w) = 0) > p,
which implies that VaRp(S(w)) = 0. This corresponds to the flat area of the hyper-
surface R for w close to 0. 
3.4 Aumann-Shapley allocations
In this section we discuss Aumann-Shapley allocations, which have been proposed for
non-homogeneous fuzzy games by Billera and Heath (1982) and Mirman and Tauman
(1982). Recall its definition in (7). It is originally characterised in the context of cost-
sharing and the axiomatizations used by Billera and Heath (1982) and Mirman and
Tauman (1982) are based on an additivity axiom that is hard to interpret in the con-
text of risk capital allocations (see Denault, 2001). The motivation for considering
Aumann-Shapley allocations for risk capital allocations relies on an asymptotic argu-
ment of Aumann and Shapley (1974). Suppose a partition is imposed on every line of
business’ participation level, and consider every fractional line of business as a sepa-
rate entity to which either full or no participation is possible. Then, the Shapley value
(Shapley, 1953) of this (‘crisp’ rather than ‘fuzzy’) game leads to an allocation method.
If we let the partition be infinitesimally fine, this allocation converges uniformly to the
Aumann-Shapley value under appropriate differentiability conditions.
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Figure 3: Hyper-surfaces R (red) and H(dE(r˜)) (blue) for risk measures TVaR0.9 (left-
hand side) and VaR0.9 (right-hand side); Example 3.16.
Aumann-Shapley allocations have appeared in the actuarial literature considering
non-homogeneous risk measures (Tsanakas, 2009) and, similar to this paper, the situa-
tion when portfolios cannot be represented as linear combinations (Powers, 2007). While
it is appealing that the Aumann-Shapley allocations use directly the gradient of r (as
opposed to that of r˜), the evaluation of (7) can be numerically expensive. For example,
when distortion risk measures are used, calculating the integral of ∂∂wi r(β1I) requires
nested simulation.
Furthermore, the Aumann-Shapley allocation dAS(r) is not necessarily in the core
C(r), unless the fuzzy game r is concave.
Theorem 3.17. If r is concave and continuously differentiable, the Aumann-Shapley
allocation dAS(r) is in the core C(r).
Proof. Due to Proposition 3.15, it is sufficient to check that the Aumann-Shapley value
is in the crisp core CC(r). Here, we use the Aumann-Shapley method of Moulin (1995);
see also Calvo and Santos (2000) and Sprumont (2005). We impose a specific equidistant
partition on the domain [0, 1] of wi, and index the intervals by Ini = {1, 2, . . . , 2n} for
all i ∈ I = {1, . . . , I}, where n ∈ N. The corresponding Transferable Utility (TU) game
is then defined as vn(S) := ρ(S({ 12n |Ini ∩ S| : i ∈ I})) = r({ 12n |Ini ∩ S| : i ∈ I}) for
S ⊆ In =
⋃I
i=1 Ini , where | · | denotes the cardinality of a set. Then, we apply the
Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) to the problem with the hypothetical agents in In for a
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given n ∈ N. This is called the Aumann-Shapley method allocation (Moulin, 1995), and
is defined as
aˆni :=
∑
j∈Ini
Φj(In, vn),
where Φ is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953).
A TU game vn is called concave when vn(S ∪ T ) + vn(S ∩ T ) ≤ vn(S) + vn(T ) for
all S, T ⊆ In. Moreover, the core of a TU game vn is defined as {a ∈ RIn :
∑
j∈In aj =
vn(In),
∑
j∈S aj ≤ vn(S), for all S ⊂ In}. Since the fuzzy game r is concave, we have
that the TU game vn is concave for every n ∈ N. Therefore, it follows from Shapley
(1971, Theorem 4 and Theorem 7) that the core of vn is non-empty, and that the Shapley
value is in the core of vn. For any vector an in the core of vn, we have by construction
for aˆni =
∑
j∈Ini a
n
j , i ∈ I, that aˆn ∈ CC(r). The limit of aˆn for n → ∞ exists, and
equals the Aumann-Shapley value due to Calvo and Santos (2000, Proposition 3.1 and
Theorem 4.1), i.e., limn→∞ aˆn = dAS(r). Since the crisp core CC(r) is a closed set (in
fact a convex polytope), we have that dAS(r) ∈ CC(r). This concludes the proof.
Aumann-Shapley allocations for concave and non-concave fuzzy games r are illus-
trated by the next two examples.
Example 3.18. As in Example 3.12, let Zi = 0, and Xi(wi) = Yi(wi) be independent
Poisson processes with intensities λi, i = 1, . . . , I. Let ρ be given by the standard
deviation risk measure. Then,
r(w) =
√√√√ I∑
i=1
wiλi =⇒ ∂r(w)
∂wi
=
1
2
λi√∑I
j=1wjλj
.
It follows that
dASi (r) =
∫ 1
0
1
2
λi√∑I
j=1 βλj
dβ =
λi√∑I
j=1wjλj
,
which coincides with dE(r˜) in Example 3.12. Hence, for this particular example, it holds
in fact that dAS(r) = dE(r˜) ∈ C(r). 
Example 3.19. Consider the case where I = 2, Y1 and Y2 are Poisson processes with
intensities λ1, λ2, and Z1, Z2 are independent zero-mean normal random variables with
standard deviations σ1 and σ2. The risk measure ρ used is the standard deviation.
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Figure 4: On the left-hand side, hyper-surfaces R (red) and H(dAS(r)) (blue); on the
right-hand side, hyper-surfaces R (red) and H(dE(r˜)) (blue); Example 3.19.
For this model, we get
r(w) =
√
w1λ1 + w2λ2 + w21σ
2
1 + w
2
2σ
2
2,
∂r(w)
∂wi
=
λi + 2wiσ
2
i
2
√
w1λ1 + w2λ2 + w21σ
2
1 + w
2
2σ
2
2
,
for i = 1, 2. This implies
dASi =
∫ 1
0
λi + 2βσ
2
i
2
√
β(λ1 + λ2) + β2(σ21 + σ
2
2)
dβ, i = 1, 2.
For λ1 = 0.1, λ2 = 0.01, σ1 = 0.1, and σ2 = 1, the Aumann-Shapley allocation is
evaluated numerically to give dAS1 (r) = 0.190, d
AS
2 (r) = 0.868. We also evaluate the
Euler allocation of the linearised fuzzy game r˜ which, using the formulas of Appendix
A, is dE1 (r˜) = 0.104, d
E
2 (r˜) = 0.954.
On the left-hand side of Figure 4, the hyper-surfaces R (red) and H(dAS(r)) (blue),
the latter generated by the Aumann-Shapley allocation, are plotted. On the right-hand
side, R is plotted along with the hyper-plane corresponding to the Euler allocation
dE(r˜). It is seen that the function r is not concave. Furthermore, dAS(r) is not in the
core C(r) (the assumption of Theorem 3.17 does not hold), while the Euler allocation
dE(r˜) is; the latter follows from Corollary 3.9. 
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4 Signals for portfolio management
In this section we study the extent to which, for an insurance risk model of the form (2),
capital allocation can provide signals that are useful for re-balancing a portfolio in order
to improve its performance. Here, we additionally require that risk measures satisfy the
property of:
• Translation invariance: ρ(V + a) = ρ(V ) + a, for all V and a ∈ R.
Distortion risk measures satisfy this property; the standard deviation risk measure can
be adapted to satisfy it, by considering the standard deviation principle ρ(V ) = E(V ) +
β
√
V(V ) for some β > 0.
A financial firm’s performance is often assessed using a Return-on-Capital (RoC)
measure. Assume that the premium that is received by insuring Xi(wi) is linear in the
exposure wi. In particular, for p = (p1, . . . , pI), the premium earned for writing S(w) is
equal to w′p. Let E(Xi(1)) = xi and assume pi − xi > 0, i = 1, . . . , I, implying that all
lines of business are expecting a profit. The underwriting profit for the whole portfolio
of S(w) is given by w′(p − x) and the risk capital is r(w) − w′x. The RoC is then
defined as
RoC(w) =
w′(p− x)
r(w)−w′x . (11)
Tasche (1999) introduced the idea of suitability of capital allocations for performance
management which in our setting translates as follows.
Definition 4.1. A vector d(r) ∈ RI is called suitable for performance measurement with
fuzzy game r if the inequalities
pi − xi
di(r)− xi
>
(<)
1′I(p− x)
r(1I)− 1′Ix
,
imply that there is an ε > 0 such that for all t ∈ (0, ε) we have
RoC(−tei + 1I) <
(>)
RoC(1I)
<
(>)
RoC(tei + 1I),
where ei is the i
th canonical unit vector in RI .
If the performance of a particular line of business, measured by pi−xidi(r)−xi , is higher
(lower) than the one of the overall portfolio at w = 1I , then increasing (decreasing) the
exposure in that line of business will lead to an improvement in the portfolio’s RoC.
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Note that in the definition of suitability, d(r) is not required to be an allocation here,
i.e. it is not assumed that its elements add up to r(1I). The next result, which slightly
adapts Tasche (1999, Theorem 1), shows that for a vector to be suitable for performance
measurement it must be an Euler allocation.
Theorem 4.2. Let r be continuously differentiable in a neighborhood of 1I . There
exists an allocation d that is suitable for performance measurement with r if and only if
∇r(1I)′1I = r(1I). If such an allocation exists, it must be d = ∇r(1I).
Proof. Due to translation invariance, we get ρ(S(w)−w′p) = ρ(S(w))−w′p = r(w)−
w′p. From this and the fact that r(w) − w′p + w′(p − x) = r(w) − w′x, we get
that our definition of RoC coincides with the function gr in Tasche (1999) applied to
the risk S(w) − w′p. Then, Tasche (1999, Theorem 1) shows that the only suitable
vector is given by ∂∂wi ρ(S(w)−w′p)|w=1I , i = 1, . . . , I. Since ρ is translation invariant,
this suitable vector equals ∇r(1I). The gradient ∇r(1I) is an allocation if and only if
∇r(1I)′1I = r(1I).
Thus, for a vector to be suitable, it must be equal to the gradient and provide a
capital allocation. Since for functions r(w) that are not homogeneous, as it is the case
in our setting, it is ∇r(1I)′1I 6= r(1I), and a suitable d cannot generally be found. Of
course, in the special case where Yi(1) = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , I and r is continuously
differentiable around 1I , then r is also homogeneous and a suitable vector is given by
the Euler allocation d = dE(r) = ∇r(1I).
More generally, the concept of suitability as defined above is problematic in our
context, as the diversification in increasing exposures implicit in the Le´vy component of
model (2) implies that portfolio performance can always be improved by writing more
insurance policies, as shown below.
Lemma 4.3. For w ∈ [0,W ]I and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, we have RoC(λw) ≤ RoC(w).
Proof. A slight modification in the argument used to prove Proposition 3.7 yields that
for all λ ∈ [0, 1] and w ∈ [0, 1]I , we have r(λw) ≥ ρ
(∑I
i=1 λXi(wi)
)
= λr(w). This
implies
λw′(p− x)
r(λw)− λw′x ≤
w′(p− x)
r(w)−w′x .
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Hence, an insurer will generally have an incentive to grow its portfolio. Limitations
to such growth are typically due to capital constraints (we do not investigate here limita-
tions in the demand for insurance). For that reason, it is meaningful to consider the case
where r(w)−w′x is fixed and the capital allocation is only considered as giving possible
signals for re-balancing the portfolio. It is seen that the Euler allocation dE(r˜) still
plays a role in this context. Proposition 4.4 shows that this allocation gives appropriate
signals for improving the portfolio underwriting profit under capital constraints.
Proposition 4.4. Let {1, . . . , I} = I+ ∪ I− with I+ ∩ I− = ∅ such that
pi − xi >
(
dEi (r˜)− xi
)
RoC(1I), for i ∈ I+,
pi − xi <
(
dEi (r˜)− xi
)
RoC(1I), for i ∈ I−.
Consider any v ∈ RI with vi ≥ 0 for i ∈ I+ and vi ≤ 0 for i ∈ I− such that
∂
∂t
(
r(1I + tv)− (1I + tv)′x
)∣∣∣∣
t=0
= 0.
Then, there exists an ε > 0 such that for all t ∈ (0, ε) we get
(1I + tv)
′(p− x) ≥ 1′I(p− x).
Proof. We need to show v′(p− x) ≥ 0. Denote ∂r(w)∂wi = ri(w). Note that
∂
∂t
(
r(1I + tv)− (1I + tv)′x
)∣∣∣∣
t=0
=
I∑
i=1
vi(ri(1I)− xi) = 0.
We have ∑
i∈I+
vi(pi − xi) ≥
∑
i∈I+
vi
(
dEi (r˜)− xi
)
RoC(1I),
and ∑
i∈I−
|vi|(pi − xi) ≤
∑
i∈I−
|vi|
(
dEi (r˜)− xi
)
RoC(1I).
These two inequalities imply
I∑
i=1
vi(pi − xi) ≥
I∑
i=1
vi
(
dEi (r˜)− xi
)
RoC(1I).
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Then the result follows, as long as dEi (r˜) ≥ ri(1I), i = 1, . . . , I.
By Proposition 3.7 we have for δ ∈ [−1, 0)
r(1I + δei) ≥ r˜(1I + δei) =⇒ r(1I + δei)− r(1I)
δ
≤ r˜(1I + δei)− r˜(1I)
δ
.
A slight adaptation of the proof of Proposition 3.7 yields r(w) ≤ r˜(w) for every w ∈
[1,W ]I . So, for δ ∈ (0,W − 1], we get
r(1I + δei) ≤ r˜(1I + δei) =⇒ r(1I + δei)− r(1I)
δ
≤ r˜(1I + δei)− r˜(1I)
δ
.
Consequently
ri(1I) = lim
δ→0
r(1I + δei)− r(1I)
δ
≤ lim
δ→0
r˜(1I + δei)− r˜(1I)
δ
= dEi (r˜),
which completes the proof.
5 Conclusions
We address a fundamental shortcoming of the literature on capital allocation, as ap-
plied to insurance portfolios. Contrary to what most capital allocation methods assume,
insurance portfolios are not linearly scalable in exposure; in that, they are unlike port-
folios of liquidly traded investments such as stocks and bonds. The lack of scalability
extends beyond insurance, for instance, to operational and credit risks. As a conse-
quence, the popular Euler allocation rule is not directly applicable in order to derive
capital allocations.
We show that the Euler allocation rule can still be used in an insurance context,
if applied to a portfolio that is linearised around its base-line exposure. The resulting
allocation belongs to the core and, thus, provides disincentives for splitting the portfolio.
Furthermore, the Aumann-Shapley allocation, which is sometimes proposed as an allo-
cation principle for non-homogeneous fuzzy games, does not have appealing properties,
as it does not generally belong to the core, except in the special case where the risk
measure is concave in exposures. Finally, we show how the Euler allocation rule for the
linearised portfolio can be used to derive appropriate signals for portfolio management.
The results derived are contingent on the model used. Our proposed model gener-
alises the linear portfolios that are standard in the literature, through the introduction
of independent Le´vy processes capturing the non-linear aggregation of insurance risk.
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Independence of the Le´vy processes could be relaxed, e.g. by considering conditionally
independent processes, as long as Proposition 3.7 remains true. Such an investigation is
beyond the scope of this paper.
Our study of capital allocation in insurance is of potential interest beyond the field of
financial risk management. The literature on cooperative fuzzy games rarely considers
fuzzy games that are not homogeneous and/or convex. For the particular class of fuzzy
games r, which are neither homogeneous nor convex (but are subadditive), we introduce
the auxiliary fuzzy game r˜, which do satisfy these properties. Thus, we show that the
core is not empty, by explicitly constructing a core element via r˜.
A The Euler allocation dE(r˜) for particular risk measures
In this appendix, we provide general formulas for the evaluation of the Euler allocation
dE(r˜) for the fuzzy game r˜ defined in Definition 3.3 and (9), in the case that the risk
measure is either the standard deviation or a distortion risk measure.
Standard deviation risk measure
Let the risk measure ρ be the standard deviation risk measure. Then, direct calculation
yields
r(w) =
√√√√V( I∑
i=1
Xi(wi)
)
=
 I∑
i=1
wiV(Yi(1)) +
I∑
i=1
I∑
j=1
wiwjC(Zi, Zj)
1/2 , (12)
r˜(w) =
√√√√V( I∑
i=1
wiXi(1)
)
=
 I∑
j=1
w2iV(Yi(1)) +
I∑
i=1
I∑
j=1
wiwjC(Zi, Zj)
1/2 . (13)
The inequality r˜(w) ≤ r(w) for w ∈ [0, 1]I follows directly from w2i ≤ wi. The Euler
allocation for a linearised model
∑I
i=1wiXi(1) is provided by (Tasche, 1999), and reads
as
dEi (r˜) =
C
(
Xi(1),
∑I
j=1Xj(1)
)
√
V
(∑I
j=1Xj(1)
) = V(Yi(1)) +
∑I
j=1C(Zi, Zj)(∑I
j=1V(Yj(1)) +
∑I
k=1
∑I
j=1C(Zk, Zj)
)1/2 . (14)
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Distortion risk measures
Recall that S(w) =
∑I
i=1Xi(wi) and define S˜(w) =
∑I
i=1wiXi(1); it holds that S(1I) =
S˜(1I). For a coherent distortion risk measure with weight function ζ we have
r(w) = E
(
I∑
i=1
Xi(wi)ζ
(
US(w)
))
, (15)
r˜(w) = E
(
I∑
i=1
wiXi(1)ζ
(
US˜(w)
))
. (16)
It is known from e.g. Tsanakas and Barnett (2003) that, subject to differentiability5,
it holds that
dEi (r˜) = E
(
Xi(1)ζ
(
US˜(1I)
))
= E
(
Xi(1)ζ
(
US(1I)
))
. (17)
This allocation is easily interpreted as the expected value of the loss Xi(1), weighted by
ζ
(
US(1I)), reflecting a higher emphasis on those states of the world where the total loss
S(1I) is high. Typically, (17) is calculated by Monte-Carlo simulation or importance
sampling.
It may appear counter-intuitive that the capital allocated to a sub-portfolio with
incomplete participation, by equation (17), involves the weighted expectation of wiXi(1)
rather than Xi(wi). However, as the following lemma shows, this is not an issue.
Lemma A.1. Let ρ be a coherent distortion risk measure with weight function ζ. Then,
wiE
(
Xi(1)ζ
(
US(1I)
))
= E
(
Xi(wi)ζ
(
US(1I)
))
, (18)
for any wi ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. For the Le´vy process Yi and wi ≤ 1 it holds that E(Yi(wi)|Yi(1)) = wiYi(1) (see
5Tasche’s (1999) requirement of continuous conditional densities implies differentiability of F−1
S˜(w)
and,
thereby, of a distortion risk measure ρ(S˜(w)). Carlier and Dana (2003) show that in L∞ differentiability
of coherent distortion risk measures is implied by strict increasingness of the quantile function F−1
S˜(1I )
(u)
in u.
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e.g. Hoyle et al., 2011). Then we have
E
(
Xi(wi)ζ
(
US(1I)
))
= E
(
Yi(wi)ζ
(
US(1I)
))
+ E
(
wiZiζ
(
US(1I)
))
= E
(
E
(
Yi(wi)ζ
(
US(1I)
)|Y(1I),Z))+ E (wiZiζ(US(1I)))
= E
(
E
(
Yi(wi)|Yi(1)
)
ζ
(
US(1I)
))
+ E
(
wiZiζ
(
US(1I)
))
= E
(
wiYi(1)ζ
(
US(1I)
))
+ E
(
wiZiζ
(
US(1I)
))
= wiE
(
Xi(1)ζ
(
US(1I)
))
.
Remark A.2. Note that even when r˜ is not differentiable, the expression on the right-
hand side of equation (17) is an allocation. Moreover, it still belongs to C(r˜) and conse-
quently (by Proposition 3.8) to C(r). This follows from the following argument:
I∑
i=1
wiE
(
Xi(1)ζ
(
US˜(1I)
))
= E
(
S˜(w)ζ
(
US˜(1I)
))
≤ E
(
S˜(w)ζ
(
US˜(w)
))
= r˜(w) ≤ r(w).
The first inequality follows from the fact that the two random vectors
(
S˜(w), ζ
(
US˜(1I)
))
and
(
S˜(w), ζ
(
US˜(w)
))
have the same marginal distributions, with the second being
comonotonic (Denuit et al., 2006, Proposition 6.2.6). The second inequality follows from
Proposition 3.7.
Remark A.3. The allocation rule as it appears on the right-hand side of (18) in Lemma
A.1 is in fact the price in a competitive equilibrium. It is shown by Aubin (1981) that for
homogeneous fuzzy games, the set of allocations in competitive equilibria coincides with
the core C(r˜). For differentiable and homogeneous fuzzy games, the core is single-valued,
and given by the Euler rule (Lemma 3.4).
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